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Peasants, Crime, 
and Tea in Interwar Egypt
Egypt’s Law 96 of 1992—which reversed 
the ability of agricultural tenants to se-
cure fixed rents and inherit tenancies in 
perpetuity—arguably represents one of 
the most significant reversals of Nasserist 
land reform, or what Ray Bush refers to as 
“counter-revolution in Egypt’s country-
side.”1 Social scientists have demonstrat-
ed the ways in which the 1992 tenancy 
law was propagated by the press, politi-
cal parties, and parliament who backed 
the power of landlords against tenant 
farmers.2 Perhaps unsurprisingly, repre-
sentations of the peasantry continue to focus on stereotypes of wayward 
peasants, killing time in cafes and enjoying the profits derived from their 
low rents. The political debate surrounding the implementation of Law 
96, which focused almost entirely on the perspectives of landowners and 
their rights, demonstrates a remarkably durable facet of the relationship 
between Egypt’s political authorities and its rural population.
The debate returns us to the social scientific discourses of the inter-
war period. These discourses depicted the Egyptian peasant both as 
culturally authentic, and as profoundly backward. Egypt’s peasants 
were to be reformed in order to become modern subjects of the na-
tion-state. Such attitudes resulted in the idea of a unique peasant cul-
tural mentalité, a stereotype including a propensity for revenge killings 
and the excessive drinking of black tea. Conven-
iently obscuring the social and political processes 
at work, this mentalité provided a catchall expla-
nation for Egypt’s rural poverty.3
The “peasant question”
In 1932 two men from the village of Badari in 
Asyut province in Upper Egypt, Ahmad Ja‘idi and 
Hasan Abu Ashur, were charged with the murder 
of a rural superintendent. The convicted men lev-
ied impassioned accusations of torture, which 
included multiple humiliations, privations, and 
brutalities that ranged from being bound, beat-
en, and dragged, to sodomy. As a legal case, the 
incident highlighted the cruel oppression of the 
peasantry by provincial notables. Yet, it also un-
derscored the peasants’ propensity for “revenge”; 
and the vulnerability of the state apparatus and 
kibar al-mullak (landed elite) to the consequences 
of this. Indeed, the outbreak of World War II in 
1939 was cause for such alarm that the state ordered all firearms re-
moved from peasant households.4
The incident at Badari highlights the larger social context for the 
emergence of the “peasant question” as a discourse of social welfare 
and the reproduction of power relations in twentieth century Egypt. 
Beginning in the middle of the 1930s, a core group of Egyptian reform-
ers began to formulate agendas that took the peasantry as their prin-
cipal object of study and reform. The question of the educatibility of 
the peasantry emerged as the call for al-nahda al-qurawiyya, al-nahda 
al-rifiyya (a rural renaissance) and reached its apex in the middle to 
late 1930s. Egyptian public intellectuals often evoked graphic images 
of rural decay and criminality in order to suggest the immediate need 
for social reform projects. Such projects were intended to guide the 
peasantry towards the adoption of “reformed” norms of behavior and 
social and cultural practices deemed more in line with the modern 
world. Representations of uncivilized peasants served to rationalize 
the expertise of social scientists and reformers and to underscore the 
civility of the urban effendiyya (Egypt’s 
emergent middle class).
In Egypt, the social uplift of the peas-
antry was understood to depend on a 
complex of social and cultural values to 
be inculcated. Among these values, al-
tarbiya wa 'l-ta‘lim (education), tamadun 
(civility and refinement), umran (cul-
ture), raqa (progress), and adab would 
lead, it was thought, to the elimination 
of vice, wretchedness, and moral de-
cline. One of the key elements in this 
transformation was the modification of 
what had become known as the “peasant character.” The peasantry had 
long been associated with pernicious habits—see, for instance Muham-
mad ‘Umar’s turn-of-the-century work, The Present State of the Egyptians 
or the Secret of their Retrogression (Hadir al-misriyyin aw sirr ta’khuruhim), 
for the author’s portrayal of the peasant as drug addict and thief. Yet, 
the 1930s and 1940s marked the beginnings of a discourse prioritizing 
the production of statistical and substantive knowledge about peasant 
crime. In this context, the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau began to 
collect data on the use of addictive substances, such as hashish, opium, 
and black tea among peasants, and to link this use to criminality and 
other social ills. The collection of statistics on rural crime, and violent 
crime in particular, helped cultivate a discourse on peasant character 
that emphasized the fellah’s lack of cultural and moral sense.
Criminology
In the late 1930s Egyptian social scientists began to compile statisti-
cal and descriptive studies on the rate, prevalence, and types of crimes 
being committed. Two key texts published during World War II were 
Muhammad Mustafa Al-Qolali’s Essai sur les causes de la criminalité en 
Egypte and Muhammad al-Babli’s exhaustive study al-Ijram fi misr (Crime 
in Egypt).5 Al-Qolali was a noted criminal lawyer who received his doc-
torate from the Sorbonne and taught criminal law at Cairo University. 
Muhammad al-Babli’s study was the canonical work on criminology at 
the time. In addition to analyzing the various theories about the factors 
predisposing to criminality, the author reviewed the methodological 
approaches to the study of crime. Al-Babli focused in particular on the 
use of statistical data. At the time of writing, al-Babli was the director of 
the School of Police, though he had been trained as a lawyer originally. 
Al-Babli and al-Qolali were good friends and were to cooperate exten-
sively.
A hallmark of criminological studies in Egypt was the classification 
of criminality as either urban or rural. Each of these types, in turn, was 
held to possess a different etiology and morphology. On the whole, 
writers argued that urban crime was materially motivated; while rural 
crime was of a violent and affective nature—a nature most transpar-
ent in crimes of revenge and passion. Social reformers, such as al-Babli, 
argued that a peasant mentalité of ignorance was a predisposing factor 
in rural crime. The peasant’s naturally patient and submissive yet labile 
character could, because of his attachment to customs such as the ven-
detta, suddenly, become vengeful. It was noted that, in comparison to 
the West, crimes of passion (and not cupidity) were more common in 
Egypt. This tendency was more marked still in the countryside, where 
“revenge” crimes (blood murder, assault, arson, destruction, or poison-
ing of crops or livestock) were far more common than crimes for mate-
rial gain. In a 1940 article on rural crime, Mustafa Al-Qolali characterized 
urban crimes as materially motivated, as accounting for the majority of 
convictions in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, and as propagated solely by 
the urban criminal. Rural crime on the other hand, was characterized by 
al-qaswa (cruelty).
Contemporary discussions of the Egyptian 
peasantry, for example relating to the recent 
tenancy law, centre on stereotypes of backward 
peasants. Such discourses, which paint 
peasants as apolitical creatures and bearers of 
a backward mentality, can be traced at least 
as far back as the interwar era. But by using 
the peasant “mentality” as an all-explanatory 
device for understanding rural poverty, these 
discourses ignore the social and political 
processes that produced rural poverty in 
the first place.
Authorities 
marvelled at the 
proportion of 
income spent on 
tea by the average 
household.
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What, then, were the motives behind rural crime? “Revenge 
is the blood wound in the social life of the countryside,” al-
Qolali noted. Most rural crime, even against property, was 
shown to be motivated by revenge or for the preservation 
of honor. As such, the custom of tha’r (vendetta), the retribu-
tion required for a breach of familial or personal honour, was 
frequently discussed. For al-Qolali, tha’r was especially per-
nicious as it generalized individual feuds to a familial level. 
Factionalism, itself, was another aspect of rural life that exac-
erbated criminality allowing individual disputes to escalate 
out into society. Other authors emphasized the triviality of 
the motives behind rural crime. Peasant crimes, they noted, 
were often caused by petty disputes, or minor thefts, usually 
concerning land, water, crops, or livestock.
Black tea
Peasant habits, too, were implicated in rural crime. In par-
ticular, the culture of the coffee house, with its attendant 
social evils, was thought to play a major role in the moral 
decadence of the peasantry. The peasantry was thought to 
have a strong propensity toward addiction to narcotics such 
as hashish, opium, and black tea. Coffee houses were places 
for peasants to “kill time,” and gamble and where they were 
exposed to various narcotics and criminal elements. Yet, 
the presence of most narcotics—hashish, opium, alcohol, 
morphine, heroin, and cocaine—was thought to be limited 
to certain small pockets of the rural community. The more 
prevalent and destructive rural addiction, served in vast 
quantities in coffee houses, was black tea. This was a potent 
brew, usually unregulated, adulterated, and equally likely to 
be drunk by children and adults. Black tea was the term used 
to refer to the product obtained from boiling tea in a kettle, adding 
water and re-boiling the mixture: “During the next twenty-four hours 
the kettle is never cleaned out but more tea leaves and more water are 
added with the result that all the so-called tea leaves are boiled six or 
seven times over producing a black, bitter liquid to which large quanti-
ties of sugar must be added.”6
The concern over boiled tea, as well as its commercial adulteration, 
was so serious that, in 1938, the Ministry of Public Health commis-
sioned a scientific study on tea bought, prepared, and consumed by 
the fellahin. The study concluded that, although the amount of caffeine 
and tannin were proportional to the amount of tea used and not de-
pendent on the length of boiling, the sheer daily quantities of caffeine 
consumed by the Egyptian peasant were bound to be, given the local 
physical environment and influences such as the presence of endemic 
diseases, the lack of nutrition, and excessive labour, deleterious to his 
health.
Tea itself came to be viewed as a narcotic substance, its effects mim-
icking those of any other addictive substance. These effects included 
nervous and physical stimulation (not dissimilar to those associated 
with cocaine use, i.e. the shivering of hands, insomnia, and even heart 
failure); psychological and physical dependence; decreased produc-
tivity; and, tellingly, a propensity to criminal activity. Seen as a lower 
class phenomenon, authorities marvelled at the proportion of income 
spent on tea by the average household—income, they reasoned, that 
could have been spent on foodstuffs. According to one estimate, the 
efficiency of the worker was reduced by twenty-five percent, “based on 
the time lost and the fact that the tea-drinker is not as able a workman 
as the non-drinker.”7
Criminality and peasant “character”
Both al-Babli and Al-Qolali resorted continuously to discussions of 
the peasant mentalité to explain rural crime. Social and economic fac-
tors rarely feature in their analysis despite the statistical correlation 
which al-Babli noted between crimes committed and agricultural sea-
sons. Namely, he showed that there was an increase in crimes during 
harvesting and storage season, or, as Tawfiq al-Hakim phrased it in 
Yawmiyyat Na’ib fil Aryaf: “every crop has its crime.” Nor did reformers 
view the peasants’ unwillingness to cooperate with the authorities in 
prosecuting criminals as a political act. According to Al-Qolali there 
was a fifty percent or greater chance for criminals to escape justice al-
together. Likewise, though disturbed by it, social researchers did not 
link the peasants’ use of al-ashqiya’ (brigands or bandits) to social or 
economic struggles. Rather than viewing the 
peasants’ refusal to cooperate with the authori-
ties (an attitude in keeping with older concep-
tions of crime and justice) as a deliberate strategy, 
these reformers attributed it to ignorance; and 
rather than treating crimes against the persons 
and properties of landowners or their agents (es-
pecially the so-called “agrarian crimes” of arson, 
destruction, or poisoning of crops or livestock) 
as masking social struggles, they treated them as 
the remnants of an archaic tradition of revenge. 
In fact, al-Babli went so far as to dismiss the po-
tential effects of revolutionary Soviet communist 
propaganda, since, in his opinion Egyptians were 
not naturally amenable to it.
Contemporary views of the Egyptian peas-
ant tend to attribute the causes of rural poverty 
to a uniform “peasant culture” that purportedly 
privileges child bearing over small households, 
extremism over secularism, and irrational folk 
traditions over national culture. Such views hark 
directly back to the theories of the interwar social 
reformers mentioned here. In sum, these reform-
ers posited peasant ignorance as the cause of 
peasant poverty; and moral and social education 
as the solution to the problem.8 Accordingly, the 
debates on Law 96 repeat, almost verbatim, inter-
war allegations of lazy tenants squandering their 
income. They thus represent the displacement of 
political and economic explanations onto the do-
main of culture.
Omnia El Shakry is Assistant Professor of History at the University 
of California, Davis. 
Email: oselshakry@ucdavis.edu
Notes
1. On the implications of Law 96 of 1992 
implemented in 1997, see Ray Bush, Counter-
Revolution in Egypt’s Countryside (London: 
Zed Books, 2002).
2. Reem Saad, “Egyptian Politics and the 
Tenancy Law,” in Bush, Counter-Revolution in 
Egypt’s Countryside.
3. Excerpts from The Great Social Laboratory: 
Subjects of  Knowledge in Colonial and 
Postcolonial Egypt by Omnia El Shakry, © 
2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland 
Stanford Jr. University, all rights reserved. By 
permission of the publisher, www.sup.org.
4. Sayyid Ashmawi, Al-Fellahun wal Sulta (Cairo: 
Mirit, 2001).
5. The following account is based on: 
Muhammad Al-Babli, Al-Ijram fi Misr (Cairo: 
Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1941); Muhammad 
Al-Qolali, “Al-Ijram fi al-rif,” Shu’un Ijtima‘iyya 
1 (July 1940): 20-29; Mahmud Bey Mahir, 
“Jara’im al-Qura,” Al-Majalla al-Tibiyya al-
Misriyya 20 (March 1937): 163-169; and 
Nathan Brown, Peasant Politics in Modern 
Egypt: The Struggle Against the State (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1990).
6. Egyptian Government, CNIB, “Adulterated 
Tea,” Annual Report for the Year 1938, 92-
94, quotation p. 92. See also Egyptian 
Government, CNIB, “Boiled tea,” Annual 
Report for the Year 1939, 104-105.
7. Dr. L. Askren, “New Method of Taking 
Opium,” in Egyptian Government, Central 
Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report 
for the Year 1938, 98.
8. For contemporary examples see Lila Abu-
Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics 
of Television in Egypt (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005) and 
Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, 
Technopolitics, Modernity (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).
Drawing from Hekmat 
Abu Zayd, Al-takayyuf 
al-ijtima’i fil rif al-misri 
al-jadid. Maktabat al-
Anglo al-Misriyya: n.d.
